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Abstract
This paper analyzes the ownership dynamics of stocks and mutual funds, using
representative household panel data, the Dutch CentER Savings Survey 1993–1998.
A bivariate dynamic binary choice model is introduced, accounting for interactions
between the two types of assets. We find that unobserved heterogeneity and state
dependence play a large role for both types of assets. The positive relation between
ownership of one type in one period and the other type in the next period is explained
by correlated unobserved heterogeneity. A negative state dependence effect of lagged
ownership of stocks on ownership of mutual funds is found, which can be explained
by the costs of shifting funds across the two forms of stock holding.
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In many industrialized countries including the Netherlands, the percentage of private
households that own some type of risky financial assets has increased substantially dur-
ing the nineties. In the US for example, the fraction of households owning some risky
financial assets increased from 31.9% in 1989 to 49.2% in 1998. In Italy, the ownership
rate increased from 12.0% to 22.1% in the same time period.1 Similar trends exist in
many other countries. To quote The Economist of March, 2001: “Wider share ownership
is profoundly important.” It spreads wealth, changes attitudes to economic freedom and
lowering business taxes, and leads to greater shareholder activism. This puts pressure on
managers to improve their performance and promises to raise productivity and economic
growth. Household stock ownership becomes more and more important with all kinds of
implications for financial markets and macro-economic policy. According to the Financial
Times of August 30 2000, the wider share ownership has reversed the public opinion on
the US Federal Reserve’s policy of cutting interest rates: while in the past, the majority
of the public would be concerned about lower returns to their savings accounts, most
households will now applaud an interest rate cut since it increases the expected returns
to their shares portfolio. On the other hand, the same Financial Times article states,
referring to the group of retail investors in risky assets, that “one problem for policy
makers analyzing this growing group of Americans is that useful data on the identity of
the average investor is hard to come by.” This illustrates the need for empirical work on
portfolio choice at the level of the individual households.
Guiso et al. (2002) provide an overview of the current state of the art in this field.
This volume links portfolio choice theory to empirical research and contains empirical
studies for several countries. While many countries have some survey data on ownership
and amounts invested for several types of assets, this data is often limited to one or more
cross–sections. Though useful for many purposes, such data is insufficient to analyze the
dynamics of portfolio choice behavior. This requires panel data. Household panels with
information on portfolio composition are currently available for the US, Italy, and the
1These numbers are taken from Guiso et al. (2002), Table 3.
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Netherlands. Studies that look at ownership dynamics are rare. Alessie et al. (2002)
present some univariate results for risky financial assets and employer sponsored saving
plans, using six annual waves of Dutch data. Ioannides (1992) uses two waves of the US
Survey of Consumer Finances to study ownership and portfolio share dynamics of many
types of assets including stocks. Both studies find an important effect of lagged ownership
on current ownership of the same asset.
According to most models of portfolio choice, all agents hold risk free financial assets,
and this is also what is typically seen in the survey data. We therefore focus on risky fi-
nancial assets. Existing empirical studies typically consider broadly defined asset groups,
with all risky financial assets as one category. Important differences between various risky
financial assets, however, will not be revealed in an analysis at this high level of aggre-
gation. Although it is infeasible to use survey data to analyze ownership of every single
financial product in the market, it seems worthwhile to distinguish a few subcategories of
risky financial assets and to investigate the dynamics in the ownership patterns of these
categories as well as the interactions between these patterns.
In particular, we think it is useful to consider the two largest categories, individual
stocks and mutual funds. The theoretical argument to treat these separately is the dra-
matic difference in the degree of riskiness and possibly in terms of costs and information
“intensiveness”, as in King and Leape (1987). At least in theory, a well-diversified mutual
fund should be placed on the efficient frontier and provide a certain expected return at
minimum risk. Mutual funds thus seem very attractive for the small, non–expert investor
who wants to invest a limited amount with relatively low transaction costs. Investment in
individual stocks is much riskier but can be motivated on the basis of private, subjective,
distributions of future returns or hedging against individual income risk. Moreover, since
transaction costs for stocks will be less than proportional with the amounts held, holding
individual stocks may be more attractive for the large investors. Portfolio heterogeneity
then arises because of differences in observable (e.g., tax rate, socio–economic character-
istics) and unobservable (e.g., risk attitude, beliefs about distribution of asset returns)
investor characteristics. An empirical argument to distinguish between the two types of
risky assets is that in many countries including the Netherlands, the mutual funds market
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has grown even more than the market for individual stocks.
In this paper, we use dynamic binary choice panel data models to explain the dynam-
ics of the ownership structure of asset portfolios. The existing dynamic random effects
probit model for panel data models is extended to the bivariate case, accounting for inter-
actions between two types of assets. One of the main features of the univariate dynamic
binary choice model with random effects is that it can distinguish between unobserved
heterogeneity and genuine state dependence. In addition, the bivariate model can explain
the correlation between ownership of one type of asset and lagged ownership of the other
type of asset both from correlated unobserved heterogeneity and from state dependence
across assets. The correlation between random effects in the ownership equations captures
correlated unobserved heterogeneity. Dummies for lagged ownership of each asset type
in each equation capture genuine state dependence effects. To investigate the sensitivity
of the results for the random effects assumption, we also compare our model with a fixed
effects dynamic linear probability model.
The empirical analysis considers ownership of stocks and mutual funds, using the
1993–1998 waves of the CentER Savings panel survey of Dutch households. This is one
of the few existing household panel surveys with detailed information on ownership of
many types of assets and debts. The sample consists of a sub–sample designed to be
representative for the Dutch population, and of a (smaller) sub–sample from the highest
income decile. Since ownership of risky assets is much more common among the rich than
among others, this makes the data particularly useful for our purposes. The estimation
sample is an unbalanced panel with 2861 households who, on average, participate in 3.4
waves.
Our aim is to increase insight in how households adjust the structure of their asset
portfolios, addressing questions such as the following. Who are the people who have
invested in mutual funds or stocks? Do background variables such as income, age, educa-
tion level, and labor market status affect ownership rates of the two types of assets in the
same way? Can changes in these background variables explain the increasing trends in
the ownership rates? Why has the ownership rate of individual stocks increased less than
the ownership rate of mutual funds? Have most new investors gone into mutual funds, or
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have people replaced individual stocks by mutual funds? If people hold mutual funds to
diversify their risk, there seems no reason to hold individual stocks in addition. Still, the
raw data show a positive correlation between ownership of mutual funds and ownership
of individual stocks. Is this spurious correlation, or is there genuine state dependence
across asset types, which could, for instance, be due to learning effects? Or is it because
the new mutual funds owners simply keep their individual stocks?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the dynamic
bivariate probit model is presented. The data are described in Section 3. Section 4
contains estimation results for the probit model and a brief comparison with the results
of a fixed effects linear probability model. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Bivariate Dynamic Random Effects Probit Model
In this subsection we introduce a multivariate discrete choice model for panel data, to
explain ownership of different types of assets. For the sake of notational convenience, we
present the bivariate case, but the generalization to the case of more than two asset types
is straightforward. This model explicitly incorporates the binary nature of the dependent
variables and produces predicted ownership probabilities between zero and one. It relies
on individual effects being uncorrelated with regressors. Since this assumption is hard
to relax in the current framework, we will, following Hyslop (1999), compare the results
with those of a fixed effects linear probability model (LPM). The LPM has the potential
drawback that predicted ownership probabilities may be outside the zero/one interval.2
Since the model will be applied to ownership of stocks and mutual funds, asset type 1
is referred to as stocks and asset type 2 as mutual funds. The following notation is used,
where the index for the household is suppressed.
yjt: dependent variables; ownership dummies for stocks (y1t = 1 if the household owns
stocks in year t, y1t = 0 otherwise) and mutual funds (y2t = 1 if the household owns
mutual funds in year t, y2t = 0 otherwise); t = 1, . . . , T .
2More details on the models and the estimation procedure are given the working paper version of this
paper, Alessie et al. (2001).
5
xt: vector of independent variables, assumed to be strictly exogenous. The same inde-
pendent variables are used in the two ownership equations.
αj: random individual effects (j = 1, 2); (α1, α2) is assumed to be bivariate normal with




ujt: error terms (j = 1, 2; t = 1, . . . , T ); (u1t, u2t) are assumed to be independent over
time and bivariate standard normal with covariance ρ.
We assume that (α1, α2), {ujt; j = 1, 2; t = 1, . . . , T} and {xt; t = 1, . . . , T} are
independent (implying that xt is strictly exogenous).
The following specification will be used.
y?1t = x
′
tβ1 + y1,t−1γ11 + y2,t−1γ12 + α1 + u1t (1)
y?2t = x
′





1 if y?jt > 0
0 else
j = 1, 2; t = 1, . . . , T (3)
Some special cases are worth mentioning. If γ12 = 0, the equation for stocks (1) does




can be estimated consistently by considering only equation (1). This would be
the standard univariate panel data probit model with state dependence (y1,t−1 is included)
as well as unobserved heterogeneity (the random effect α1). See Heckman (1981a) for a
discussion of this model. Similarly, the equation for mutual funds (2) can be estimated
as a univariate model if γ21 = 0.
If y2,t−1 enters the first equation but error terms and random effects in the first equation
are independent of error terms and random effects in the second equation, then y2,t−1 is
weakly exogenous in the equation for y1t. In this case the first equation could be treated
as a univariate model with (weakly) exogenous regressors only.
One of the main advantages of dynamic random effects models is their ability to
distinguish between unobserved heterogeneity (random effects) and state dependence (the
lagged dependent variable). Both phenomena can explain why ownership of stocks in
period t is positively correlated with ownership of stocks in period t + 1 (conditional on
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observed background variables xt and xt+1). The bivariate extension can in addition
address “spill–over effects” from one asset type on the other. If ownership of stocks in
period t + 1 is correlated to ownership of mutual funds in period t, this can be due to
correlated unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., a non–zero covariance between α1 and α2) or
due to state dependence across asset types, i.e., a non–zero value of γ12. This is important
for understanding the dynamics of the asset ownership decisions. For example, a positive
value of γ12 could mean that mutual funds – which are easily accessible and advertised
on a large scale – may have a learning effect in the sense that their acquisition changes
people’s attitudes to holding risky assets in general. People may then be induced to start
buying individual stocks. On the other hand, a positive correlation between the random
effects would simply mean that the same people who find it attractive to hold stocks in
general also have a preference for holding mutual funds.
Some of the restrictive features of the specification in (3) are easy to generalize. We
have estimated univariate specifications allowing for first order autocorrelation in ujt but
found insignificant values of the autocorrelation coefficient for both assets. Adding in-
teractions of the two lagged dependent variables or of lagged dependent variables with
xt would make the model as flexible as a transition model with four different ownership
states (both assets owned, stocks only, mutual funds only, neither of the two; the stan-
dard transition model would not include the random effects, however). We experimented
with interaction terms but found they were mostly insignificant and did not change the
qualitative conclusions. The assumption that α1 and α2 are independent of the time
varying regressors can be relaxed by including linear combinations of the regressors in
all time periods in the equation, in the spirit of Chamberlain (1984). This substantially
complicates the analysis, however, particularly due to the unbalanced nature of the panel.
In specifications that include log financial wealth as a regressor, we will also include the
sample average of log wealth. The robustness of our results to correlations between α1 and
α2 and other regressors will be investigated using a linear probability model, discussed at
the end of the next section.
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Initial Conditions and Estimation
This subsection is an informal discussion of how to estimate the model; details can be
found in Alessie et al. (2001). In a short panel, there is a problem with the initial
conditions (cf. Heckman (1981a)). One way to deal with this problem is to add static
(“reduced form”) equations for the first time period similar to the dynamic equations, but
without the lagged dependent variables. The coefficients are allowed to be different from
the coefficients in the dynamic equations, the random effects are linear combinations of
the random effects in the dynamic equations, and the error terms are allowed to have a
different covariance structure. This is the straightforward generalization of the solution
that was given by Heckman (1981b) for the univariate case. In principle, the static
equations can be seen as linearized approximations of the true reduced form (obtained
by recursively eliminating yt−1 until t = −∞). Heckman’s simulations suggest that the
procedure already works well in short panels, i.e. the approximation error does not lead
to a large bias on the parameter estimates.3
The complete model can then be estimated by Maximum Likelihood (ML), including
the nuisance parameters of the static equations. Conditional on the random effects, the
likelihood contribution of a given household can be written as a product of bivariate
normal probabilities for over all time periods. Each bivariate normal probability is then
the probability of the observed ownership state, either conditional on the ownership state
in the previous year (t ≥ 2) or unconditional (t = 1).
Since random effects are unobserved, the actual likelihood contribution is the expected
value of the conditional likelihood contribution, with the expected value taken over the two
individual effects. This is a two-dimensional integral. It can be approximated numerically
using, for example, Gauss–Hermite–quadrature. Instead, we use simulated ML: bivariate
errors are drawn from N(0, I2), they are transformed into draws of the random effects using
3An alternative solution is explored by Lee (1998), who treats the initial values as fixed. Lee’s
simulation evidence suggests that this does not lead to any serious bias if the panel consists of 20 waves,
but it does if the panel has only eight waves. It therefore seems less appropriate for our panel of six
waves. Chay and Hyslop (2000) compare various ways to deal with the initial conditions problem in logit
and probit models. They find that the probit model with the Heckman procedure performs better than
other random effects models.
8
the parameters of the random effects distribution, the conditional likelihood contribution
is computed for each draw, and the mean across R independent draws is computed. If
R → ∞ with the number of observations, this gives a consistent estimator; if draws
are independent across households and R → ∞ faster than
√
N , then the estimator is
asymptotically equivalent to exact ML (see Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994), for example).4
In our case, the data at hand is an unbalanced panel, due to attrition, non–response,
and refreshment. We assume that attrition and item non–response are random. We
will use the complete unbalanced panel. This is more efficient than using the balanced
sub–panel only.
3 Data
We use six waves of the CentER Savings Survey (CSS), drawn from 1993 until 1998.
Nyhus (1996) describes the set up of this data set and its general quality. The panel
consists of two samples. The first is designed to be representative of the Dutch population
(REP), but, due to survey non-response, the actual REP samples are not completely
representative. The REP contains approximately 2000 households in each wave, including
refreshment samples compensating for panel attrition. The second sample was drawn
from high-income areas and should represent the upper income decile (HIP). Initially, it
consisted of about 900 families. It is available in each wave except the final one. For our
analysis, REP and HIP samples are combined. In the descriptive statistics, we correct
for non-random sampling by using sample weights that are based upon income and home
ownership. These weights are constructed using information from a much larger data set
(Housing Needs Survey (WBO), collected by Statistics Netherlands), which is close to
representative for the Dutch population.
The CSS data were collected via on-line terminal sessions, where each family was
provided with a PC and modem. The answers to the survey questions provide general
information on the household and its members, including work histories and labor market
4In the application, we found R = 100 to be sufficiently large in the sense that results did not change
if R was increased further.
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status, health status, and many types of income. Important for our purposes are the ques-
tions on assets and debts. For most of the forty asset and debt categories, respondents
first indicate whether they own the type. If they do, they get a series of questions on
amounts and the precise nature of each asset in that category. Non–response in the own-
ership questions is negligible, but non–response in some of the questions on the amounts is
substantial. On average, about 20% of those who own stocks do not know or refuse to give
the value of their stocks. Mutual funds have a lower non–response rate of around 13% per
year. For some descriptive statistics (such as shares of specific asset types in total financial
assets, see below), the item non-response creates a problem. We have therefore imputed
the amounts for those who reported to be owners but did not provide an amount. See
Alessie et al. (2002), who also provide an extensive description of all categories of assets
and debts in the survey.
We focus on two types of risky financial assets: stocks and mutual funds. The CSS
distinguishes between two types of stocks: stocks from substantial holding and (other)
shares of private companies. There are very few people who hold the former type, but
these people typically hold high amounts. The two types of stocks are different for tax
purposes, since income from a substantial holding is treated as business capital. There is
a large variety of mutual funds, composed of many different assets. In 1997, according to
De Nederlandsche Bank (2001), more than 50% of the total amount in mutual funds was
invested in stocks, while about 30% was held in real estate and about 10% in bonds. The
survey data that we use do not provide enough information to separate the mutual funds
according to their investment.5
During the period under consideration, dividends from other shares and from mutual
funds were liable to income tax to the extent that they exceed an exemption threshold
(Dfl 2,000 for couples, Dfl 1,000 for singles). Capital gains on these are not taxed. The
thresholds on dividends are separated from the thresholds on interest on savings, creating
a tax incentive for holding stocks or mutual funds as well as saving accounts.
5Note that the definition of mutual funds deviates from that adopted in Alessie et al. (2002) where
so–called ‘growth funds’ are included. The latter are typically low–risk funds, which is the reason why
we exclude them here.
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The first two columns of Table 1 show how ownership rates of the two types of assets
have developed during the years of the survey. The ownership rate of stocks has risen from
11.4% to 15.4%. Mutual funds were more often held than stocks, with an even higher
growth rate during the sample period. Many financial institutions have been successful in
presenting mutual funds as a low threshold asset, available to many individual investors.
Still, the majority of Dutch households held neither stocks nor mutual funds in 1998.
This lack of participation can be explained by monetary transaction costs and information
costs, both of which can be substantial.6
The remaining columns of Table 1 show the time path of amounts invested in stocks
and mutual funds, as shares of total financial assets.7 While the ownership rate of stocks is
always lower than the ownership rate of mutual funds, the reverse is true for the shares of
stocks and mutual funds in total financial wealth. This is because the few people who hold
stocks typically hold high amounts of them. The growth of the shares is less spectacular
than the growth of the ownership rates. The shares may be strongly influenced by some
large amounts, due to the skewed distribution of wealth and its components. Some rich
people hold large amounts, and there are very few of these in the sample, particularly
in 1998, the year without high income panel. This may explain why some of the time
patterns are not as pronounced as in aggregate data produced by Statistics Netherlands
(see Alessie et al. (2002)). In the remainder of this study, we will not use the amounts
data and focus on ownership.
In Figures 1 and 2, we present (head of household) age and cohort patterns of the
ownership rates of stocks and mutual funds, based upon the six waves of the survey. We
use five year–of–birth cohorts, with birth years 1915–1919 for the oldest cohort, until birth
6In the Netherlands, explicit transaction costs are low (about 0.5% of the investment) but implicit costs
(entry and exit fees incorporated in the buying and selling price of the fund) are higher. The maximum
entry fee is about 2.5% of the investment, and the maximum exit fee is about 1.5% (see Consumentenbond
(1999)). Apart from the transaction costs, most mutual funds charge a management fee of about 0.5% per
year and apply minimum investment restrictions. These implicit costs are comparable to the substantial
transaction costs in Italy discussed by Guiso and Jappelli (2002). It is not clear, however, whether Dutch
investors are aware of the implicit costs.
7The share is defined as the total amount invested in the asset by all households (weighted with the
sample weights), divided by (weighted) total financial wealth of all households.
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years 1970–1974 for the youngest cohort. Cohort labels indicate the middle year-of-birth.
Each figure gives the raw ownership rates for each cohort in each wave; the six points for
each cohort represent the six average age levels at the times of the six interviews, and
form a “cohort curve”. The jumps between the cohort curves show that, apart from age
effects, there are cohort or time effects. The cohort curves are not horizontal, implying
that there are time and/or age effects; the fact that not all cohort curves are the same
shows that there is more than just time effects. As usual, cohort, time and age effects
cannot be identified without further assumptions. A plausible interpretation of both
figures, assuming that cohort effects are zero, is that ownership rates increase with age
and that there are positive effects of calendar time, particularly for the older cohorts.
Alessie et al. (2002) find a similar increasing age pattern for the category of all risky
financial assets. This deviates from the pattern for some other countries. Italy and the
US, for example, have a hump shaped pattern.
Table 2 describes the dynamics of the ownership patterns of stocks and mutual funds
separately. This gives a partial view of mobility, since only transitions of households that
sell all their stocks or mutual funds or enter the market of stocks or mutual funds are
shown, and not the changes in (positive) amounts held. The table presents the numbers
of owners and non-owners of stocks and mutual funds in each balanced subsample and
the percentages of exits and entries.8 For example, 4.2% of households that did not own
stocks in 1993, owned stocks in 1994. This is about 3.6% of all households in the 1993–
1994 sample. On the other hand, 22.6% of those who owned stocks in 1993 (i.e., 3.4% of
all households in the sample) no longer owned stocks in 1994. Thus ownership mobility
is substantial, for stocks as well as mutual funds. In particular, the fractions of owners
selling their mutual funds or stocks are larger than expected, given the high returns on
these assets in the nineties. On average, 21.2% of all stock owners no longer owned stocks
one year later, and 26.3% of mutual fund owners no longer owned mutual funds one year
later. The large transition rates are in a similar order of magnitude as those reported
for the US and Italy.9 In absolute numbers or as a percentage of total sample size, entry
8The sampling weights are not used. The transition rates hardly change if observations with very
small amounts are excluded.
9Vissing–Jørgensen (2002, p. 13) finds that in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 28.1% of all
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transitions are somewhat more numerous than exit transitions, in line with the rising
ownership rates in Table 1. Entry and exit numbers are larger for mutual funds than for
individual stocks, which could point at lower transaction costs for mutual funds.
The balanced subpanel of households that participated in the survey for six consecutive
years consists of 405 households. 297 of these never owned stocks, while 34 households
owned stocks in all six waves. 271 households never owned mutual funds and 21 always
owned mutual funds. In this subsample, there are 47 households who exit from stocks at
least once, and 23 of these go back into stocks after they have exited. 76 households exit
from mutual funds at least once, and 35 of them go back into mutual funds after having
exited.
Where did people go after exiting from stocks or mutual funds? Did stockholders leave
the market completely or did they become mutual fund holders? Averaging over all pairs
of waves shows that of those who exited from stocks and did not own mutual funds, only
12.1% went into mutual funds. Of those who exited from mutual funds and did not own
stocks, 14.1% went into stocks. Complete substitution of stocks for mutual funds or vice
versa is thus not very common; most people who sell off their only type of risky financial
assets leave the market completely.
Table 3 shows the correlation between holding one asset type in one period, and holding
the other asset type in the next period. For all years, the ownership rate of stocks in year
t + 1 is larger for those with mutual funds in year t than for those without mutual funds
in year t – conditional on not owning stocks in year t. For example, 9.4% of those without
stocks and with mutual funds in 1993 owned stocks in 1994. On the other hand, only
3.5% of those who had neither stocks nor mutual funds in 1993, owned stocks in 1994.
Thus there is some positive correlation across ownership of the two asset types. The same
conclusion is obtained when ownership rates of mutual funds are considered. Whether
households hold stocks in 1989 but not in 1994 or vice versa. Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1997, p. 455)
consider ownership of one category consisting of stocks, mutual funds, managed investment accounts or
trusts in the Survey of Consumer Finances 1983–1989, and report transition rates of 10% from ownership
to non–ownership and 19% from non–ownership to ownership. Miniaci and Ruberti (2001) report two-
years transition rates from ownership to non-ownership between 32% and 42% using the SHIW survey of
the Bank of Italy.
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this positive correlation reflects some genuine state dependence effect (such as learning)
or (observed or unobserved) heterogeneity, is one of the issues we will analyze in the next
section, using the models in Section 2.
4 Results
The results of the random effects probit model are discussed in the first subsection. In
the second subsection, these results are briefly compared to those of a fixed effects linear
probability model. In the final subsection, the implications of the probit results for ex-
plaining the growth in ownership rates of stocks and mutual funds are presented. This
is based on predicted probabilities, which are not always between 0 and 1 in the linear
probability models, and will therefore be done on the basis of the probit results only.
4.1 Random Effects Probit
Tables 4 and 5 give the results for four specifications of the bivariate probit model. For
stocks and mutual funds, the same explanatory variables are used. Financial wealth is not
included in the first two specifications since it may not be strictly exogenous. In the final
two specifications, lagged log financial wealth and its own household specific average (over
the observation window) are included. This controls for the potential correlation between
lagged financial wealth and the individual effects (see Hausman and Taylor (1981), for
example).10 We find a very strong positive relation between the average log financial
wealth level on ownership of stocks as well as mutual funds. The effect of log financial
wealth in the previous year is much smaller and, surprisingly, negative. It is significant
at the 5% level for stocks and at the 10% level for mutual funds. Probably the relation
between asset ownership and financial wealth requires more structure than is incorporated
in the current model, and this is beyond the scope of the paper. The main reason for
presenting results with financial wealth is to check whether or not estimates are sensitive
to its inclusion.
10Including an arbitrary linear combination as in Hyslop (1999) is not possible due to the unbalanced
nature of the panel.
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In specifications 2 and 4, an indicator for risk aversion is included. This is the answer
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (agree strongly) to the question whether the
head of household agrees with the statement I think it is more important to have safe
investments and guaranteed returns than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest
possible returns. This question has only been posed to respondents with household income
of 20,000 Dfl. or more, thus excluding 15.6% of all households. Moreover, 4.8% of all
households in the sample answered “don’t know”. As expected, the probability to own
stocks falls with the degree of risk aversion. Such a relation is not found, however, for
mutual funds. In specification 2, those who answer “don’t know” or do not get the
question have a lower tendency to own mutual funds. In specification 4 where financial
wealth is also controlled for, the risk aversion dummies are jointly insignificant in the
mutual funds ownership equation.
To avoid correlation with random effects and endogeneity of income and the marginal
tax rate, income is non-capital income and the marginal tax rate is the maximum of
the within–household imputed marginal rate applied to pseudo–taxable income, in which
individual capital income is replaced by its cross–sectional average (following Agell and
Edin (1990)). The effects of income and the marginal tax rate are hard to disentangle,
due to the strong (positive) correlation between these variables. We find that both effects
are positive for both types of assets. For stocks, the income effect is significant (at the
two-sided 5% level), while for mutual funds, the tax effect is significant. An explanation
for the stronger income effect for stocks than for mutual funds may be that high income
households will typically have more to invest, making the relatively large fixed costs
component of buying or holding individual stocks less important. Moreover, the sheer
size of the portfolios of the higher income groups may be bigger relative to the unit
prices of stocks, thus allowing them to hold a bigger variety of stocks and to achieve
greater diversification than low income groups. This argument is not present in mutual
funds where holders can achieve diversification with small investment amounts. King and
Leape (1998) find that the marginal tax rate has a statistically significantly positive effect
on ownership of corporate equity but conclude that taxes play a rather limited role in
explaining differences in portfolio composition across households, especially when it comes
15
to stock ownership.
The income tax rules for stocks and mutual funds are the same (see Section 3). The
fact that capital gains are not taxed creates an incentive to hold stocks or mutual funds,
which increases with the household’s marginal tax rate.11 This explains the positive effect
of the marginal tax rate. The larger tax effect for mutual funds could be due to the fact
that suppliers of these funds strongly advertise their tax favored nature.
Labor market status variables for the head of household are jointly significant in
both equations. The retired are significantly more likely to own stocks or mutual funds
than employees. The reason might be that income risk from pensions is lower than
from earnings, and that the willingness to invest in risky assets falls with the amount of
background risk (cf., e.g., Hochguertel (2003)).
The most striking result is the enormous effect of self–employment on ownership of
stocks: a self–employed head has a more than 25%-points higher probability to own stocks
than an employee (the reference group), ceteris paribus, which is at odds with findings
in other countries.12 The effect remains almost the same if controls for financial wealth
or risk aversion are included. This result is consistent with Heaton and Lucas (2000)
who find that people with private business holdings in the US hold a disproportionately
large share of common stocks. Part of the explanation could be that the self–employed
often hold shares in their own firm which will often be shares from a substantial holding.
Excluding stocks from a substantial holding from our analysis reduces the size of the effect
to about half its size, though it remains strong and significant.
Since Figures 1 and 2 in the previous section have a plausible interpretation without
cohort effects, we have included age and time effects but no cohort effects. This identifies
the age and time patterns. Age is significantly positive for stocks as well as mutual funds,
in line with findings for risky asset ownership by King and Leape (1987), who attribute
the age effect to the accumulation of information about investment opportunities. This
information argument seems particularly relevant for individual stocks, since these are
the more “information intensive” type of risky assets. The time effects are similar for the
11See Poterba (2002) for a general discussion of the impact of tax rules on portfolio choice.
12Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) and Eymann and Boersch-Supan (2002) find that the self-employed
are less likely to hold risky financial assets than employees in the US and in Germany.
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two asset types and show that the assets have become more popular during the last few
years of the survey.
The education coefficients indicate that the higher educated significantly more often
hold stocks but not mutual funds. Again, this could be attributed to the greater in-
formation processing requirements for investing in stocks relative to mutual funds where
investments are made by professionals. If financial wealth is included, however, the effects
of education vanish (see Table 5), implying that the education effects in Table 4 might
pick up wealth effects. This finding is quite unusual in the literature (cf., e.g., Guiso and
Jappelli, 2002, and Bertaut and Starr-McCluer, 2002). A similar interpretation can be
given for the dummy “High Income Panel.” The positive significant effect of this dummy
for both asset types largely vanishes if financial wealth is included (Table 5). The way
the high income sample is drawn and the general tendency of the income–rich to save a
lot make it plausible that selection into this panel is not only based upon income but also
on wealth, explaining why the dummy variable serves as a wealth proxy.
The estimated standard deviations of the random effects are 1.44 and 1.20 for stocks
and mutual funds, respectively. The standard deviations of the error terms are normalized
to one. Thus, unobserved heterogeneity plays a major role, explaining more than half of
the unsystematic variation in the model.
In both equations, the lagged dependent variables concerning ownership of the same
asset type are significantly positive. To interpret these results, predicted ownership proba-
bilities for the various lagged ownership states are presented in the final panels of Tables 4
and 5. Exogenous variables are set to their (weighted) sample means and random effects
are set to zero. According to specification 1, owners of stocks are about 16.7% points
more likely to own stocks next period than non–owners with the same (observed and
unobserved) characteristics if they do not own mutual funds, and 15.4% points if they
do. For mutual funds, the differences are even larger (20.1% points if no stocks are held,
17.4% points if stocks are held). Similar differences are found for the other specifications.
Explanations for positive state dependence are the costs of acquiring stocks or mutual
funds (i.e., genuine transaction costs, not the costs of holding the assets)13 and asset spe-
13Hyslop (1999) formalizes this in a stylized dynamic optimization model; a similar model can be used
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cific learning: once people own the asset, they are more familiar with it, and are more
aware of its risk and return characteristics.
All the results discussed so far relate to the dynamics of each of the two types of
assets separately. In most respects, these results are similar to what would be predicted
by separate univariate models. The bivariate model, however, also gives insight in the
relation between the two ownership decisions.
The “cross–effects” of lagged ownership of one asset type on ownership of the other
asset type are both negative and one of them is significant at the 5% level: ceteris paribus,
those who do not own stocks are significantly more likely to own mutual funds in the next
period than those who own stocks. According to specification 1 in Table 4, the differences
are 4.4%-points and 2.9%-points for those who did and did not own mutual funds in
the previous period. If financial wealth is controlled for (specification 3 in Table 5), the
other cross–effect becomes significantly negative also. If the risk aversion index is included
(specifications 2 and 4), the negative signs remain but the effects are no longer significant.
The negative cross–effects cannot be explained by general learning: if ownership of
one asset type would improve knowledge about the other asset type, a positive cross–
effect would result. Thus the results on the own and cross–effects together suggest that
if learning takes place, it is specific for the type of asset.
On the other hand, negative cross–effects are also consistent with the adjustment cost
arguments that explained the strong positive effects of lagged ownership of the same
asset type. People who own stocks but no mutual funds have an incentive to remain
focused on stocks to avoid the adjustment costs, while people who own neither stocks nor
mutual funds and who consider investing in risky assets, face adjustment costs anyhow.
Adjustment costs thus give an explanation for own as well as cross state dependence
effects, while learning can only explain the univariate effects. These adjustment costs
may reflect the actual (monetary) transaction costs involved with buying or selling an
asset, but may also include non-monetary components such as the required effort, the
need to collect information, etc. Sticking to one type of assets may also be due to the
realization that too much churning does not pay and that portfolio choice should be
here for each of the two assets separately.
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governed by a long horizon.
The estimated correlation coefficient between the two random effects is significantly
positive, ranging from 0.42 in specification 4 to 0.66 in specification 1. This suggests
that the people who have a large preference for holding stocks (given their observed
characteristics), tend to be the same people who have a preference for holding mutual
funds. These may be the people with lower degrees of risk aversion or higher interest in
financial markets. The positive correlation between holding stocks and holding mutual
funds in the data, is to a large extent due to this positive correlation in unobserved
heterogeneity.
Allowing for correlation in the individual effects in the two equations has a major
impact on the estimates of the cross–effects of ownership of one type of asset on owner-
ship of the other type of asset in the next time period. If we estimate the model with
the correlation between the random effects restricted to zero, we find significant positive
estimates for both cross–effects. Not allowing for correlation between unobserved het-
erogeneity terms would thus lead to a large upwards bias on the effect of ownership of
one asset type on ownership of the other type and to misleading conclusions about the
importance of general learning.
The correlation between the error terms in the two equations is small and insignificant.
A negative correlation could point at fixed holding costs for each asset type (such as
monitoring costs) that would be an incentive for specialization. Vissing–Jørgensen (2002)
finds evidence of such costs. A positive correlation could point at a common element in
monitoring both assets, or at benefits of diversification. Apparently, the positive and the
negative effects cancel or do not play a role.
4.2 Linear Probability Model
To check the sensitivity of the main conclusions for the random effects assumption, some
standard linear dynamic panel data models were estimated. See, for example, Verbeek
(2000, Section 10.4) for an accessible exposition and Hyslop (1999) for a comparison of
univariate linear probability and random effects models. The following assumptions are
the basis for GMM estimation:
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1. The time varying independent variables are uncorrelated to the error terms (strict
exogeneity) but can be correlated with the individual effects.
2. Time invariant independent variables included in the model are uncorrelated to the
error terms as well as the individual effects.14 15
3. The error terms are uncorrelated over time.
To avoid the well–known problem that the small sample performance of GMM deteri-
orates with too many moments, only the moments combining regressors and error terms
that are as close as possible in time are used. Standard GMM estimation is applied,
separately for the equations for stocks and mutual funds. Any type of heteroskedasticity
is allowed for, including that implied by the binary nature of the dependent variable.
We ran several specifications with different sets of independent variables.16 On the
basis of Sargan tests for the over–identifying restrictions, we selected the specification
presented in Table 6. For stocks, the over–identifying restrictions are not rejected at the
2% level although they are rejected at the 5% level. For mutual funds, the overidentifying
restrictions are not rejected at any conventional significance level. Moreover, the hypoth-
esis of no second order autocorrelation in the residuals of the differenced equations is not
rejected for either type of assets, supporting the assumption of no autocorrelation in the
error terms.
The same explanatory variables are used as in the probit model in Tables 4 and 5.
The results are largely in line with the probit results. For example, the large effect of
self–employment on the probability of holding stocks is again the most salient finding. We
can now conclude that this is not an individual effect, since correlation between individual
effects and regressors is controlled for.
The main difference with specification 1 in Table 4 is the estimated “cross–effect”
of lagged ownership of stocks on ownership of mutual funds, which is now positive and
insignificant, whereas it was negative and significant in the random effects probit model.
14This also applies to some variables that only vary systematically over time such as age.
15We have also estimated a model in which this assumption is avoided, excluding the time-invariant
variables from the regression. This exclusion has little effect on the other parameter estimates.
16We use the DPD98 software as described in Arellano and Bond (1998).
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This confirms that no evidence of general learning is found, but does not support the
adjustment costs argument given in the previous subsection.
The main purpose of the linear probability models is to perform a sensitivity check
on the findings on the basis of the probit models. The specification in Table 6 as well
as estimates of alternative specifications confirm that most findings are very similar (tax
and income effects, effect of labor market position, effects of lagged ownership of an
asset type on the same asset type). The only differences concern the cross–effects of
lagged ownership of stocks on ownership of mutual funds and of lagged ownership of
mutual funds on ownership of stocks. Still, we always find significant negative effects
or insignificant effects, and only find significant positive effects if a zero correlation of
unobserved heterogeneity terms for the two equations is imposed—a restriction that is
always fiercely rejected in favor of positive correlation. This confirms that cross–effects
due to general learning cannot be established and points at asset specific learning and
adjustment costs.
4.3 Explaining the Growth in Ownership Rates
The probit model results presented in Table 4 can be used to predict ownership proba-
bilities for individual households and aggregate ownership rates for groups of households
under different scenarios. Such predictions can be used to analyze how much the explana-
tory variables in the equations contribute to the changes in the aggregate ownership rates
of stocks and mutual funds over time. The idea is similar to the Oaxaca decomposition
that is commonly used in studies on wage differentials (Oaxaca, 1973).
The results for specification 1 are presented in Table 7. The top panel refers to stocks,
the bottom panel to mutual funds. The first row of each panel presents observed changes
in mean predicted ownership rates (in percentage points), using common samples for the
two years considered. Random effects are set to zero. Since time dummies for all years are
included, these sample changes reflect the increasing trend in aggregate ownership rates
over the same years reasonably well.17 The other rows compare two sets of predicted
17This should still improve if random effects were integrated out instead of set to zero, but then the
correlation between random effects and lagged ownership dummies should be accounted for.
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aggregate ownership rates: those using the observed explanatory variables and those in
which one or more explanatory variables are replaced by their lags. Take, for example,
the change in the stocks ownership rate from 1997 to 1998 of about 3.48% points. If in
the 1998 sample age is replaced by its lagged value (i.e., age in 1997), the predicted mean
ownership rate falls by 0.26% points. In other words, age changes explain 0.26% points
of the total 3.48% points. Similarly, changes in incomes and marginal tax rates (which
become somewhat larger, on average) explain a 0.20% points rise of the ownership rate.
All exogenous regressors (not including time dummies or lagged dependent variables)
explain a rise of about 0.44% points. The lagged dependent variables explain a rise of
0.11% points, mainly due to the rise in the ownership rate of stocks from 1996 to 1997. In
total the regressors in the model (time dummies not included) explain 0.55% points of the
3.48% points rise in ownership of stocks. The remainder is not explained by the regressors
and captured by the time dummies, whose contribution can be seen as the (residual) part
of the change in ownership that cannot be explained by the economic variables in the
model.18
The results for mutual funds are similar. The conclusion is that age is the only exoge-
nous variable which consistently positively contributes to explaining the rising ownership
rates. The main reason is that age is not only significant in the probits but also systemat-
ically increases over time. Self-employment, for example, is very important for ownership
of stocks, but the fraction of self–employed in the sample does not vary systematically
over the years.
For the other specifications, the regressors explain a similarly small part of the total
rise in the ownership rates. According to specification 4, the fall in average risk aversion
explains 0.29% points and 0.48% points of the rise in ownership of stocks in 1996–1997
and 1997–1998, but still, all the economic variables together explain only a small part of
the total rise. This may mean that most of the increase was induced by supply factors
such as the development of the mutual fund industry, aggressive advertising of financial
services, etc., rather than by changes in household circumstances.
18This can be compared to the changes “explained by” parameter changes in the usual Oaxaca decom-
position; in this model with time dummies, only the constant term can vary over time.
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5 Conclusions
As the stockholder base has widened considerably over the last decade in many countries,
understanding how households make their portfolio decisions over time has wide–ranging
implications for understanding the allocation of risk in financial markets, the distribution
of wealth, and pricing relationships for individual assets. This paper is one of the first
studies of the dynamics of individual households’ (multivariate) investment strategies
using representative panel survey data.
We have estimated dynamic models explaining ownership of the two main types of
risky financial assets in the Netherlands: stocks and mutual funds, that differ in de-
gree of riskiness, “information intensiveness,” and adjustment costs. Mutual funds are
particularly attractive for small investors with little financial knowledge, since they are
managed by professionals. Our results confirm this to some extent, since we find that the
probability to own stocks increases significantly with income while the probability to own
mutual funds does not. Tax incentives, on the other hand, play a larger role for mutual
funds than for stocks. Self–employed are much more likely to hold stocks than others,
while they do not have a different ownership rate of mutual funds. Explanations could
be that the self–employed are interested in specific stocks to hedge against their larger
income uncertainty, or that acquiring knowledge about specific firms and their prospects
is closer to their every day practice. The alternative explanation that the self–employed
simply have different preferences and care less about diversification, is unlikely since the
effect remains the same if a subjective index for risk aversion is included or if unobserved
(preference) heterogeneity is allowed to be correlated with background variables in a fixed
effects setting.
We find that the dynamics of ownership of either type of risky assets are driven by
state dependence as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Both explain part of the persis-
tence of ownership of both types of assets in the data. The state dependence can be
explained from the adjustment costs of buying or selling the asset or from asset type spe-
cific learning. On the other hand, the positive sample correlation between ownership of
one type of asset and lagged ownership of the other asset is explained from (observed and
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unobserved) heterogeneity only. One source of this could be a joint element in monitoring
or other holding costs that makes it attractive to hold both asset types simultaneously.
Another reason could be that combining stocks and mutual funds creates opportunities
for diversification that cannot be attained by mutual funds alone (since these typically
invest in certain sub-samples of stocks).
If correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity in the two ownership equations
is not allowed, a positive effect of owning one type of asset on owning the other type
in the next year is found. This changes completely, however, once the two unobserved
heterogeneity terms are allowed to be correlated. We then find a positive correlation and
no evidence that households substitute one type of assets by the other, or that ownership
of one type leads to general learning, more financial knowledge and a larger probability
of buying the other type of assets. In contrast, we find some evidence of a negative
effect of owning one type of assets on buying or keeping the other type. This can be
explained by adjustment costs, implying that those who have acquired one specific asset
will tend not to reallocate their money to the other type of assets. Such adjustment costs
will comprise the actual transaction costs involved with portfolio adjustment, but may
also contain non–monetary or perceived costs components, reflecting effort, the cost of
acquiring information, etc..
In their introduction Guiso et al. (2002) report that, conditional upon ownership, the
age profile is relatively flat in most countries. This finding indicates that people do not
rebalance their wealth portfolio very frequently. Guiso et al. (2002) point out that this
portfolio inertia cannot be justified by (standard) analytical or computational portfolio
models. Analytical models stress the role of the length of horizon for optimal choice of
portfolio composition (see Gollier (2002)). More complicated simulation models similarly
imply policy functions for portfolio shares that are sensitive to age (see Haliassos and
Michaelides (2002)). Moreover, professional financial advisors encourage their clients to
reduce the share of risky assets as they age. Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) also find that
households choose a particular portfolio of assets and do not make many changes even
when their circumstances change and in spite of professional advice. Similarly, Poterba
(2002) finds that households fail to rebalance their portfolios to take full advantage of
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(changes in) tax provisions.
Classical papers like those of Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) assume that agents
live in a frictionless world and have HARA preferences. They predict myopic optimal
behavior (i.e. a constant fraction of risky assets in the portfolio) for a given individual.
To make such models more realistic, it would be useful to introduce dynamic features. Our
results would suggest asset specific learning experiences and real or perceived adjustment
costs are particularly relevant. These can explain why households once they have decided
which asset classes to participate in, are not likely to revisit this decision.
Future research can go in several directions. First, we have not modelled the amounts
held. Although this is not without measurement problems, it certainly seems a relevant
extension. It could also help analyze the importance of fixed costs of holding, buying,
and selling assets, extending the work of Vissing–Jørgensen (2002). Second, if data for a
longer time period become available, it seems useful to relate the ownership dynamics to
the trends in the financial markets or to relevant macro variables such as unemployment,
inflation or expected inflation, consumer confidence, etc. Third, straightforward exten-
sions of our models could be used to analyze other asset and debt types, or to analyze
assets at a less aggregate level. For example, to understand the dynamics and in partic-
ular the underlying cost structure driving these, it seems relevant to distinguish people
who substitute one stock for the other from people who do not trade at all.
Finally, it would be interesting to extend the analysis with data on the recent time
period with falling asset returns. The rationale for people then not venturing into risky
assets seems to be that the return foregone is too low compared to the costs saved. In
times when returns are high (1993–1998), this may make sense, and the time dummies in
our models seem to pick up the sluggishness in the adjustment. On the other hand, there
is some asymmetry in the sense that once adjustment costs are incurred, part of them
will be sunk (at least the information acquisition costs). Selling the assets will therefore
not be associated with the same costs. Such an analysis will have to await future data
releases covering the recent period of downturn.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Ownership Rates and Portfolio Shares
ownership rate portfolio share
mutual mutual
year stocks funds stocks funds
1993 11.4 11.8 21.3 5.4
1994 9.9 12.8 20.6 6.7
1995 11.4 12.9 22.0 6.2
1996 13.5 14.7 24.0 7.0
1997 14.4 16.2 25.3 7.1
1998 15.4 18.4 23.8 10.0
Note: weighted statistics; portfolio share: ratio of wealth held in stocks
or mutual funds to total financial assets
Table 2: Transitions (Univariate)
Stocks
years owners exits in % exits in % non-owners entries in % entries in %
t/t + s at t of owners of all at t of non-owners of all
1993/94 310 22.6 3.4 1768 4.2 3.6
1994/95 290 26.6 4.1 1593 5.5 4.7
1995/96 275 21.5 3.5 1407 6.1 5.1
1996/97 239 19.7 3.3 1174 6.0 5.0
1997/98 159 15.7 2.5 839 4.4 3.7
1993/97 128 25.8 4.1 672 11.6 9.8
Mutual Funds
years owners exits in % exits in % non-owners entries in % entries in %
t/t + s at t of owners of all at t of non-owners of all
1993/94 310 26.5 4.0 1768 6.8 5.8
1994/95 336 32.4 5.8 1547 6.1 5.1
1995/96 299 20.4 3.6 1383 5.7 4.7
1996/97 253 26.1 4.7 1160 8.2 6.7
1997/98 190 26.3 5.0 808 7.6 6.1
1993/97 138 36.2 6.3 662 12.4 10.3
Note: unweighted statistics; ”all” refers to the total number of sample observations in the balanced
subpanel at times t and t + s.
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Table 3: Transition Rates (Bivariate)
ownership proba-
ownership year t bility in t + s
years mutual mutual
t/t + s stocks funds stocks funds
1993/94 no no 3.5 5.4
yes no 75.3 17.8
no yes 9.4 73.9
yes yes 81.3 72.9
1994/95 no no 4.5 5.8
yes no 72.5 8.4
no yes 12.0 65.8
yes yes 74.6 70.9
1995/96 no no 4.4 5.0
yes no 78.7 11.0
no yes 17.6 77.7
yes yes 79.1 83.6
1996/97 no no 5.3 7.1
yes no 78.7 16.9
no yes 10.7 70.0
yes yes 82.5 79.6
1997/98 no no 3.0 6.9
yes no 87.7 13.6
no yes 13.4 71.4
yes yes 80.8 76.9
1993/97 no no 9.4 10.9
yes no 74.4 22.1
no yes 25.0 64.6
yes yes 73.8 61.9
Note: See Table 2
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Variable Name coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
constant -4.8132 0.4400 -3.4065 0.3213 -4.7038 0.4299 -3.2691 0.3270
stocks (t-1) 1.1909 0.1077 -0.2540 0.1232 1.2983 0.1034 -0.1597 0.1250
mutual funds (t-1) -0.1401 0.1073 1.1144 0.0946 -0.0534 0.1008 1.1305 0.0954
age     0.0210 0.0054 0.0091 0.0044 0.0204 0.0052 0.0087 0.0044
education
intermediate 0.3623 0.1797 0.0491 0.1547 0.3052 0.1704 0.0249 0.1528
vocational 0.0372 0.1375 0.0225 0.1124 0.0322 0.1304 0.0225 0.1113
high 0.4054 0.1628 0.2161 0.1307 0.3517 0.1518 0.1897 0.1291
Wald (p-value) 0.0028 0.2039             0.0076             0.3051
log income 0.0522 0.0182 0.0219 0.0171 0.0500 0.0178 0.0205 0.0173
HH marg. tax rate 0.6158 0.3408 1.2520 0.2623 0.6180 0.3324 1.2343 0.2662
high-income panel 1.0030 0.1414 0.5981 0.1027 0.8546 0.1292 0.5358 0.0998
labor market status
unemployed 0.1552 0.3431 -0.0121 0.2814 0.1420 0.3227 0.0302 0.2783
retired 0.3142 0.1519 0.3857 0.1274 0.2901 0.1457 0.3680 0.1265
disabled -0.5144 0.3592 0.1424 0.2316 -0.4913 0.3386 0.1541 0.2313
selfemployed 1.5511 0.1695 0.1317 0.1538 1.4593 0.1660 0.1150 0.1559
other 0.4810 0.2371 -0.0329 0.1889 0.4570 0.2340 -0.0114 0.1873
Wald (p-value) 0.0000 0.0487             0.0000             0.0794
female -0.4962 0.1536 -0.0736 0.1117 -0.4177 0.1485 -0.0482 0.1114
risk aversion
low --- --- --- --- 0.3974 0.1398 -0.1125 0.1350
intermediate --- --- --- --- 0.2643 0.0807 0.0440 0.0687
don't know --- --- --- --- -0.5045 0.3494 -0.8004 0.3000
not available --- --- --- --- 0.0940 0.1149 -0.2024 0.0940
Wald (p-value)             ---             ---             0.0007             0.0048
year
1995 0.0614 0.0855 -0.0661 0.0739 0.0538 0.0844 -0.0728 0.0744
1996 0.2101 0.0966 0.0483 0.0904 0.1882 0.0943 0.0547 0.0910
1997 0.3542 0.1090 0.2106 0.0872 0.3154 0.1081 0.2142 0.0870
1998 0.6144 0.1378 0.3089 0.1039 0.5573 0.1418 0.3273 0.1050
Wald (p-value) 0.0001 0.0021             0.0011             0.0014
std.dev. RE 1.4446 0.1602 1.2027 0.1241 1.2506 0.1503 1.1294 0.1228
correl. RE 0.6590 0.0549 0.5994 0.0613                         
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Reference groups for dummy variable groups are: low education; paid employee; high risk aversion. Estimates of the initial conditions 
equations are available upon request. The predicted probabilities are ownership rates (in %) obtained from the model for an "average" 
household: exogenous variables are set to their weighted sample means, random effects are set to zero, and the lagged ownership 








Variable Name coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
constant -12.5107 1.6092 -9.4148 1.0226 -11.4330 1.5161 -8.7041 1.0014
stocks (t-1) 1.1531 0.1575 -0.4358 0.1831 1.2681 0.1563 -0.3185 0.1774
mutual funds (t-1) -0.4175 0.1630 0.9944 0.1415 -0.0967 0.1636 1.0613 0.1410
age     0.0008 0.0074 -0.0124 0.0062 0.0038 0.0071 -0.0119 0.0060
education
intermediate -0.0216 0.2592 0.0152 0.1984 -0.0641 0.2468 0.0066 0.1912
vocational 0.0307 0.2001 -0.0268 0.1508 0.0026 0.1884 -0.0413 0.1461
high 0.2577 0.2305 0.0789 0.1738 0.1783 0.2171 0.0208 0.1667
Wald (p-value) 0.4469 0.8696             0.5908             0.9546
log income 0.0824 0.0267 0.0123 0.0230 0.0838 0.0261 0.0151 0.0229
HH marg. tax rate 0.1087 0.4680 0.9149 0.3561 0.0884 0.4571 0.8680 0.3528
high-income panel 0.1288 0.1454 -0.0711 0.1195 0.1098 0.1376 -0.0743 0.1139
labor market status
unemployed 0.5903 0.4752 -0.1068 0.4148 0.5987 0.4300 -0.0376 0.4034
retired 0.4507 0.2079 0.4781 0.1789 0.3791 0.2001 0.4209 0.1721
disabled -0.1927 0.5550 0.2038 0.3207 -0.2193 0.5271 0.1765 0.3054
selfemployed 1.3236 0.2428 -0.4412 0.2180 1.2807 0.2400 -0.4284 0.2109
other 0.5131 0.3815 0.2807 0.3226 0.4569 0.3835 0.2819 0.3188
Wald (p-value) 0.0000 0.0219             0.0000             0.0357
female -0.1328 0.1794 0.2111 0.1520 -0.1211 0.1738 0.1794 0.1477
log fin. wealth (t-1) -0.1089 0.0504 -0.0925 0.0554 -0.1227 0.0526 -0.1023 0.0537
log fin. wealth (avg.) 0.9535 0.1235 0.8048 0.0992 0.8445 0.1166 0.7524 0.0972
risk aversion
low --- --- --- --- 0.5097 0.1933 -0.1713 0.1912
intermediate --- --- --- --- 0.3635 0.1184 0.0779 0.0875
don't know --- --- --- --- -0.3167 0.5151 -0.5769 0.4641
not available --- --- --- --- 0.3147 0.1603 -0.0479 0.1336
Wald (p-value)             ---             ---             0.0091             0.3394
year
1996 0.1406 0.1065 0.1288 0.1006 0.1122 0.1060 0.1336 0.0997
1997 0.2737 0.1294 0.3247 0.1012 0.2226 0.1314 0.3164 0.1012
1998 0.5503 0.1705 0.4428 0.1247 0.4544 0.1749 0.4331 0.1272
Wald (p-value) 0.0123 0.0011             0.0721             0.0022
std.dev. RE 1.4101 0.2223 1.1605 0.1787 1.2051 0.2112 1.0361 0.1760
correl. RE 0.6074 0.0995 0.4247 0.1214
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Table 6: Linear Probability Models
Stocks Mutual Funds
Variable Name Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
constant –0.1403 0.0540 –0.1368 0.0566
stockst−1 0.1734 0.0541 0.0102 0.0503
mutual fundst−1 –0.0640 0.0392 0.2044 0.0494
age 0.0025 0.0009 0.0035 0.0009
education
intermediate 0.0603 0.0270 0.0063 0.0249
vocational 0.0148 0.0178 –0.0028 0.0171
high 0.0747 0.0259 0.0442 0.0243
log income 0.0073 0.0034 0.0015 0.0032
HH marg. tax rate –0.0436 0.0444 0.1284 0.0621
high–income panel 0.1439 0.0211 0.0849 0.0212
labor market status
unemployed 0.0070 0.0290 0.0230 0.0283
retired 0.0476 0.0293 –0.0263 0.0321
disabled 0.0257 0.0386 0.0048 0.0395
self–employed 0.2239 0.0580 0.0105 0.0369
other 0.0461 0.0232 –0.0197 0.0260
female –0.0395 0.0160 –0.0164 0.0170
year
1996 0.0176 0.0074 0.0033 0.0077
1997 0.0347 0.0093 0.0365 0.0109
1998 0.0638 0.0124 0.0539 0.0147
Number of households 1870
Number of observations 5950
Sargan, 14df (p−value) 26.7231 0.021 19.1600 0.159
AR(2) test (p−value) 0.094 0.925 1.336 0.181
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Table 7: Oaxaca Decompositions of Changes in Ownership Rates (in percentage points)
years 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1993/97
Change in
ownership rate Stocks
Total change n.a. 1.40 1.87 1.85 3.48 n.a.
exlained by
change in . . .
stockst−1 &
mutual fds.t−1 n.a. 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.11 n.a.
education 0.00 0.04 0.00 –0.00 0.01 0.02
age 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26 1.10
log income 0.16 –0.02 –0.02 –0.22 0.16 –0.02
tax rate 0.08 –0.03 –0.02 –0.12 0.06 –0.20
tax & income 0.23 –0.07 –0.05 –0.36 0.20 –0.25
labor market 0.00 0.50 –0.02 0.02 –0.02 0.69
all x-s 0.42 0.70 0.18 –0.09 0.44 1.62
time dummies 0.00 0.60 1.57 1.61 3.03 n.a.
Change in
ownership rate Mutual Funds
Total change n.a. –0.71 1.71 2.29 1.80 n.a.
exlained by
change in . . .
stockst−1 &
mutual fds.t−1 n.a. 0.27 –0.25 0.12 0.16 n.a.
education 0.00 0.04 –0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04
age 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.60
log income 0.07 0.00 0.00 –0.10 0.07 0.03
tax rate 0.13 –0.08 –0.10 –0.34 0.15 –0.56
tax & income 0.18 –0.09 –0.11 –0.47 0.20 –0.59
labor market 0.00 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.65
all x-s 0.29 0.25 0.13 –0.18 0.43 0.74
time dummies 0.00 –0.88 1.55 2.35 1.49 n.a.
Note: Figures in this Table derive from Specification 1 in Table 4. They are based on
weighted means of (univariate normal) ownership probabilities as predicted from equations
(1) and (2), with random effects set to zero; presented are the differences in such means
between the baseline case and the case where some regressors are lagged: “total change”:
all right hand side variables are lagged, including ownership dummies and time dummies;
“all x-s”: all regressors except time dummies and lagged ownership dummies are lagged.
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Figure 1: Ownership by Cohort: Stocks
Figure 1: Ownership by Cohort: Stocks
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Figure 2: Ownership by Cohort: Mutual Funds
Figure 2: Ownership by Cohort: Mutual Funds
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